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Abstract
The high growth of Multi–Agent Systems (MAS) in Open Networks
with initiatives such as Agentcities1 requires development in many diﬀer-
ent areas such as scalable and secure agent platforms, location services,
directory services, and systems management. In our case we have focused
our eﬀort on security for agent systems.
The driving force of this paper is provide a practical vision of how se-
curity mechanisms could be introduced for multi–agent applications. Our
case study for this experiment is Carrel [9]: an Agent–based application
in the Organ and Tissue transplant domain. The selection of this appli-
cation is due to its characteristics as a real scenario and use of high–risk
data for example, a study of the 21 most visited health-related web sites
on the Internet2 discovered that personal information provided at many of
the sites was being inadvertently leaked for unauthorized persons. These
factors indicate to us that Carrel would be a suitable environment in or-
der to test existing security safeguards. Furthermore, we believe that the
experience gathered will be useful for other MAS.
In order to achieve our purpose we describe the design, architecture
and implementation of security elements on MAS for the Carrel System.
1 Introduction
Nowadays, it is unsurprising that in diﬀerent technologies such as Operating
Systems [16], Web Services [12] and P2P [19] and diﬀerent areas such as Govern-
ment, Electronic Commerce [2], Health systems [5] and Industrial applications
1http://www.agentcities.org/
2prepared for the California HealthCare Foundation http://www.chcf.org
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require security mechanisms. In previous mentioned technologies and applica-
tions have been made studies / approaches / ratings to include security ele-
ments, this fact reveal the importance of the concept security. The foundations
of application security [21] are Cryptographic3 and network security techniques
[22](computer security). The experience obtained in these areas are / could be
useful in other environments and therefore we have applied this experience to
MAS. We can observe also the importance of security aspects in MAS in the
last years with diﬀerent studies [17], applications and practical X–Security [18]
and Jade–S [23] elements.
Our objective in this paper is to show that is possible to work with a sure
agent–based application. To achieve this objective we have applied X–Security
package to the Carrel Application. X–Security implements authentication and
secure communication among agents. How ﬁnal outcomes we dispose of one
agent-based application, multi–platform where the message are encrypted and
each one agent has its identiﬁcation. With this work / fact / eﬀort we expect
that the users / developers / programmers realize that elements of security in
MAS exist and they could be useful.
The work we have carried out is documented in two technical reports. In
the ﬁrst paper [7], we described the Carrel system and identiﬁed security issues
and counter measures. In this second paper we will exploit this analysis and
address some of the security threats described in this scenario and we reﬁne
the cryptography and network security principles. The main idea is to relate
security foundations with security elements on agent platforms using a concrete
security tool for MAS.
2 Design
This section describes the security design system. The two possible options
were X–Security 4 and Jade–S [23]. The ﬁrst is a stand–alone agent that oﬀers
agent identity and ensures secure communication. The second tool approach as
security by building features into an existing platform. In the process to choose
the more adequate tool our principal requirement was that the work realised
were useful for other applications with the mini possible change and with the
maxim independence for the application. On the other hand the secure system
had to be tensile to include new security elements into the future. With this
requirements we decided to choose X–Security package. In the remainder of this
paper we will describe how X–Security was used.
In the rest of the section, we describe the elements involved in our design
as well as relevant theories in security area. These oﬀer us the foundations,
principles and practices useful in our approach. We will also explain how the
3http://www.ssh.fi/support/cryptography/
4http://agents.felk.cvut.cz/main/index.php
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agent paradigm could provide new point of view in security elements and ﬁnally
we deﬁne the security elements and design realized for the Carrel Application.
2.1 Approximation to theoretical security aspects
There are a number of well known security theories / models. The ﬁrst of these
theories is the OSI5 security architecture (ISO 7498-2) which provides an useful
approach in the design phase analysis since it deﬁnes a set of security services,
mechanisms and description of attacks. Focusing on security services also makes
relevant the following deﬁnition from RFC 28286.
“A processing or communication service that is provided by a system to give
a speciﬁc kind of protection to systems resources; security services implement
security policies and are implemented by security mechanisms.”
Types of security services include:
• Authentication: The assurance that the communicating entity is the one
that it claims to be.
• Authorization: This service provides protection against unauthorized use
of resources.
• Conﬁdentiality: The protection of data from unauthorized disclosure.
• Integrity: The assurance that the data received are exactly as sent without
modiﬁcations.
• Nonrepudiation: The protection that an author of a message cannot deny
sending this.
The relation between these and as X–Security confronts with these is de-
picted in Table 1.
The second foundation to consider is that the X–Security package could be
seen as a Public–Key Infrastructure (PKI)([1], [13]). This second foundation
take an agent approach because it interrelates agents and PKI. The PKI deﬁ-
nition is:
“PKI is a security architecture that has been introduced to provide an in-
creased level of conﬁdence for exchanging information over an increasingly in-
secure network.”
PKI refers to the combination of software, encryption technology and ser-
vices that enable to organizations to protect the security of the information
they exchange. This work provides us with experience / mechanisms such as
5http://www.iso.org
6http://www.armware.dk/RFC/rfc/rfc2828.html
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Security service How X–Security confronts it
Authentication By means of creating / checking message signa-
tures.
Authorization The X–Security certiﬁcate include information
related with the level of authorization.
Conﬁdentiality Using encrypted messages among agents.
Integrity By using a message digest. This means that the
system generates as seemingly random pattern
of bits for a given input and if somebody modi-
ﬁes this message it is not possible to obtain the
original message.
Nonrepudiation Including message signatures the message.
Table 1: Relation between OSI security services and X–Security
Key / Certiﬁcate Life Cycle Management, Key and Certiﬁcate Management,
Hierarchy and Distribution of Certiﬁcation Authorities and so on. It has been
used by us to design proposal solutions and describe problems in the process to
include X–Security package over MAS.
A third relevant approach is named “Role–Based Access Control (RBAC)
to information”. [20] One of the most challenging problems in managing large
networked systems is the complexity of security administration. Today, secu-
rity administration is costly and prone to error because administrators usually
specify access control lists for each user on the system individually. RBAC7 is
a technology that aims to reduce the complexity and cost of security adminis-
tration in large networked applications.
With RBAC, security is managed at a level that corresponds closely to the
organization’s structure. Each user is assigned one or more roles, and each role is
assigned one or more privileges that are permitted to users in that role. Security
administration with RBAC consists of determining the operations that must be
executed by persons in particular jobs, and assigning employees to the proper
roles. Complexities introduced by mutually exclusive roles or role hierarchies
are handled by the RBAC software, making security administration easier. This
mechanism provide near elements to agents theory such as role and organization
[10] what it makes interesting for its study in MAS environments.
2.2 Use of agents in security
Agent–based approaches is an useful technology for solving complex problems
[14] and could provide a model from which a comprehensive and complete set
of security services may be developed by means of agent paradigm [6]. Also it
7http://csrc.nist.gov/rbac/
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observable the fact that the security could follow the three patterns of interac-
tions in MAS such as cooperation, coordination and negotiation in agent theory.
But, what are the new contributions or advantages of this new paradigm
respect to computer network security classic programs? We consider that the
advantages oﬀered by this new vision are implicitly inside of agents’ character-
istics [15]. With this vision, an agent is deﬁned as a logical component of the
security system, designed to implement a particular function or it groups to
of functions. The functional modularisation of the system thus makes possible
obtain a ﬂexible security architecture. For example, we could develop agents
such as Recovery Agent, Monitoring Agent, Security Services Agent, Security
Certiﬁcation Agent to achieve more security in our non–agent platforms and
agent platforms by means of the agent paradigm.
2.3 Identiﬁcation of the security elements
So far, we have explained how theoretical security foundations help design secure
MAS and identiﬁed the list of elements that X–Security oﬀers. They are:
1. Certiﬁcate Management: Manages the certiﬁcates for the agents. In the
X–Security case it is named Security Certiﬁcation Authority (SCA).
2. Message Encryption(8): Secures the communication between agents. Al-
gorithms used are:
• Message signing – SHA with DSA 8
• Message encrypting – RSA [12]
Certiﬁcate Management is used for securing information concerning the mes-
sages, communicated among two or more entities, such as their integrity, origin,
time, and destination, can be protected by the provision of non-repudiation
mechanisms. The potential conﬂicts about these issues may be resolved by a
third–party, the notary, which must be trusted by both communicating entities.
In order to perform its function, the notary must hold the necessary information
to provide the required assurance in an identiﬁable manner.
Message Encryption: The previous algorithms (SHA, DSA and RSA) are
asymmetric key algorithms family. In this type of algorithms two keys are
used. The encryption key is named the public key and the decryption key is
named the private key. With this system people / agent which wish to receive
encrypted messages should publish their public key then the sender encrypt the
message with his public key and only the person that have the private key will
can decrypt the message. The main problem with approach is key distribution
(transporting valid public–private key paris to users). To solve this problem we
could opt for one of two approaches:
8http://home.pacbell.net/tpanero/crypto/dsa.html
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1. Two entities involved in a communication already share a key, which some-
how has been distributed to them, and
2. The use of a key distribution center.
X–Security uses the second option.
2.4 Design description
With this background, we are can go on to describe the ﬁrst general design,
depicted in Figure 1. The main concerns inﬂuencing this design are that Carrel
must function open environment in which we have diﬀerent MAS.
MAS
sender/
receiver
security
module
test/sign signature
decrypt/encrypt
messages
MASsecuritymodule
test/sign signature
decrypt/encrypt
messages
Open
Network
Certification
Authority
Trusted third party
(e.g. notary, arbiter)
sender/
receiver
Figure 1: Security design on Carrel
3 Architecture
The environment and elements involved on the basis of the previous design
we can now make concrete. This architecture is depicted in Figure 2 and the
elements described are:
• Platforms: We have 3 platforms, Platform–1 and Platform–2 represent
diﬀerent UCTx applications (one per hospital) and Platform–3 represents
Carrel application.
• SCA: Stores the certiﬁcates of diﬀerent agents. The SCA acts like third-
party and is on separate platform (Platform–3) because we want that the
certiﬁcation authority to be independent from the rest of the platforms
which depend from the hospitals to which they are associated.
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Figure 2: Security architecture on Carrel
3.1 Distributed Trust Architecture
An obvious starting point would be works with all the applications on the same
platform (this is depicted 3). However an important issue is the need to assure
security among diﬀerent platforms.
Our ﬁrst step was to include X–Security in our application with a simple
design and we believed that the easiest way to make this was using one unique
platform for all the agents in the system (we depicted this ﬁrst approach in
Figure 3). However this did not reﬂect application constraints. Our system
(as was explained in [9]) is set up for diﬀerent organizations where each one is
separated geographically and is evident that each one of them is the owner of its
platform / users / actions. For these reasons, is not possible to continue with
this design.
Also X–Security does not work with multiple SCA on diﬀerent platforms be-
cause there is no mechanism for certiﬁcate sharing among SCA’s. On the other
hand the certiﬁcates are necessary because these includes the keys for signing
and encrypting messages. In order to solve this problem, X–Security’ authors
have extend the X–Security slot with a new element SCA AID containing AID
(name and address) of SCA at which is the used certiﬁcate registered. But the
whole problem is more complicated. We can not just only extend this slot, we
should have to deﬁne some trust delegation between SCA’s. This is necessary
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Figure 3: All of applications in the same platform makes security provision
easier but is not realistic for deployment.
because otherwise anybody could start its own SCA and send an encrypted /
signed message to your / other agent – and this agent will trust it, because it
is signed. For this reason, we should design some SCA–trust–delegation mech-
anism to solve it.
There are a number of options for providing SCA services across multiple
platforms:
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Figure 4: Second approach, distributed SCAs
Option 1 The idea, in this case, is to include the diﬀerent certiﬁcates where
they are needed; thus, if SCAx is on platformx and it needs a certiﬁcate of
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one agent in platformy with SCAy is necessary to achieve this certiﬁcate
and save it in SCAx.
Option 2 To modify SCA so that it can work with diﬀerent SCAs and in case
that it does not ﬁnd a certiﬁcate that it consulted in related SCAs.
Option 3 Create one unique authority that oﬀers certiﬁcations. Using only
one SCA for all agents in the same or in the diﬀerent platforms. Imagine
you have platformx and platformy, we could start a new platformz with
an own SCA and register all agents from both platforms x and y at this
SCA in platformz. At this moment agents in both platforms could send
messages between themselves.
Of these options we have chosen option 3 because this oﬀers a more ac-
curate solution and behaviour between technical barrier and real application.
X–Security does not provide certiﬁcate distributed (technical barrier) as it tries
to make options 1 and 2, furthermore these options has another problem (real
application), the fact that nobody will give its conﬁdence on unguaranteedMAS.
4 Implementation
In this section we describe the changes necessary to use X–Security in Carrel
and by extension we believe that the description is suﬃcient general for others
MAS over Jade which would like to use X–Security. Annex D also describes the
concrete modiﬁcations that were necessary for our application.
The SCA is a stand–alone agent that does not aﬀect agents interaction, how-
ever it needs to start ﬁrst. This is because the SCA is required like a security
service, it provides by security module that is placed between the agent’s core
and communication layer.
The whole Carrel system is based on JADE 2.61 and is implemented in Java
1.4. Communication security is assured using X–Security package.
The Security class is the main communication security class in the X–
Security package. This is the only class from the security package, ordinary
user should deal with. If user wants to use communication security inside its
agent, he / she should to create a new Security object and then start security
either as Security Certiﬁcation Authority using startSecCertAuth method or as
an arbitrary agent using startAnyAgent method.
If the agent wants to sign or encrypt content of an ACLMessage, it can use
setSignature or enCrypt methods. Messages are processed automatically, the
user has to combine its the MessageTemplate with the MessageTemplate re-
turned by the getWaitTemplate method and then pass the received message to
the anyProcess method. This method returns the decrypted or tested method
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or throws SecException if these tests fail. The security object can be shut down
using endSecCertAuth or endAnyAgent methods.
The modiﬁcations to include X–Security are:
1 In the diﬀerent agents from our application we must include the security
package in order to start to work with X–Security. When is started it
should register in SCA. For this reason we call the startAnyAgent which
starts create security object. It is described in section 9.1.
2 Once the security package has been prepared we could use its diﬀerent fea-
tures. In section 9.2 we described for example how given of encrypt a
message.
3 Finally, once an Agent sends signed / encrypted messages the last step is to
treat these in the reception. For example, in the piece of code in section
9.3 we show how to receive a message. We should follow the same process
in the rest of incoming message such as getMessage, extractContent.
5 Problems arising
In previous sections, we have related security theory and agents. Afterwards
we have been described a tool that joins the two worlds. In this section we will
describe concrete issues related to the use of this tool in MAS.
5.1 Communication
The idea of using asymmetric algorithms (public–private key) is that one el-
ement sends an encrypted / signed message and other element receives the
message and decrypts / tests it. Therefore the basic model used is one–to–
one. Nevertheless, in many MAS we have diﬀerent scenarios with more complex
patterns than one–to–one communication after , for example we have commu-
nications patterns and we would like send a message to group of agents or to
have a protocol with diﬀerent interactions among agents.
In the case that the message is addressed to multiple agents we will not
known which public key should be applied over the message because we have
more than one receiver and consequently more than one possible public key.
We do not have the problem if it signed the message. To solve this problem
(depicted in Figure 5) we have considered two options:
1. Create a group key. A key that is shared by a group of agents and is
/should be used when someone would like send a message to this group
(once to each receiver).
2. Send the same message n times. If the Agent would like to send a message
to n receivers, we could do the same, sending the same message n times
to the n receiver once.
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We have chosen the second option, the main reason is that the ﬁrst option
is more complicated to manage. Is necessary to create, for example, a hierarchy
of group keys and to include a timestamp to the keys in a group. The fact to
use second option do not provoke much changes in our application.
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Figure 5: Communication 1 to 1 vs. Communication 1 to n
5.2 Fipa behaviours
The ACLMessage follows the FIPA 2000 “FIPA ACL Message Structure Spec-
iﬁcation” 9 speciﬁcations. In this case we would like to focus on two concrete
behaviour implemented in Jade: FipaRequestResponderBehaviour and Fipa-
QueryResponderBehaviour (or in new the Jade version which is AchieveRERe-
sponder). The ﬁrst of these behaviours works as a dispatcher, reading the
:content slot of received request messages and spawning diﬀerent behaviours
according to the action requested. To be able to handle requests, user deﬁned
behaviours must extend Action inner class; when a request message arrive, an
implementation of Factory inner interface is retrieved from the registered action
factories, using the action name as key. The problem observed is that if the
message is encrypted and the agent uses these behaviours, when it tries to ﬁnd
out what type of action is inside of the content it produces an error (the same
problem occurs if you do not use FIPA–SL10 code in your message). To solve
the problem we have observed three possibilities:
1. Modify the behaviour: Modifying the code of classes aﬀected (class Fi-
paRequestResponderBehaviour and FipaQueryResponderBehaviour) do-
ing that before the reading the :content slot be decrypted the message (if
it is necessary).
9www.fipa.org/specs/fipa00061/XC00061E.html
10http://www.fipa.org/specs/fipa00008/SC00008I.html
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2. Wrapping the behaviour: Creating a level between the behaviour and the
incoming messages systems which extends the behaviour to work with
encrypted messages.
3. Making the platform itself responsible for encrypted / decrypted: Making
that the platform encrypt / decrypt the messages between agent by means
of Agent Communication Channel.
We have chosen the ﬁrst option. We should modify the Jade core and it
makes version dependent. The necessary modiﬁcations are included in section
10.
6 Deployment
The agents in the Carrel application should register their certiﬁcates (agent
gains them at the creation time). The certiﬁcates are registered with SCA
trusted by all community members.
During the registration phase, the agent sends its username and password
to SCA. According to this data SCA sets up a security level. When one agent
asks other agent to perform an action, the second agent checks competence of
the ﬁrst one by its certiﬁcate. Once layer has been inserted are able to assure
that the rest is transparent for the user / agent implemented Agents only need
to call the methods to encrypt / sign the messages that they send and call the
methods decrypted / tested signature when they receive a message using secu-
rity mechanisms.
In order to verify that X–Security actually addresses some of the threats
listed in [7] our MAS over the threats, we have used diﬀerent performances:
6.1 Correct performance
This performance is based on the normal expected behaviour of the Carrel sys-
tem. In this scenario the agents communicate with SCA when they would like to
obtain certiﬁcates of other agents or when they like to publish its certiﬁcates. In
our case we have encrypted all. Inter–platform and intra–platform messages and
deployed one unique SCA plug in where is Carrel is who manage the certiﬁcates
among the diﬀerent agents. We have tested that the communication among
agents is encrypted. We have followed the whole diﬀerent messages among the
whole diﬀerent agents checking that the system follow the functionalities and
protocols.
We have tested diﬀerent scenarios to assure that the behaviour of Carrel
with security as good behaviour as in the previous version.
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The ﬁrst of these tests is when we have one agent that tries to obtain a piece.
This is depicted in the ﬁrst diagram of Figure 6 and we have observed that the
behaviour is the expected one.
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Hospital ?
UCTx
rejected
SCA
FinderAgentx
FinderAgent0
SCA
FinderAgentx
FinderAgent0
SCA
FinderAgentx
FinderAgent0
Figure 6: Diﬀerent tests to assure that Carrel works correctly
The second test is over the same conﬁguration but in this case we use two
agents that try to obtain the same piece but the diﬀerent between this two
agents is one of them has a higher priority (urgency–0) the result is that this
agent is selected as the one to obtain the piece (even if the agent with major
priority arrives later in the auction of the piece). This is depicted in the second
diagram of Figure 6.
6.2 Incorrect performance
In this performance we also checked failure cases. In particular those where we
have some kind of problem such as incorrect certiﬁcate, expired certiﬁcate or
diﬀerent Security Level. All of these possible irregularities are related with the
certiﬁcate and therefore we could observe the importance of security certiﬁca-
tion authority in all process related with the security in our MAS.
One test in this part is to verity that one agent that is not present in SCA
is prevented from accessing the system. This is depicted in the third diagram
of Figure 6.
7 Summary and Future Work
This paper presents a security architecture based an agent application. Our
system speciﬁcally set two goals:
1. The protection of agents against the eavesdropping, and
2. The protection of the application against impersonation, unauthorised
access.
Our future work reﬂect over the problems arisen in design section. In the
next subsections we describe some of these possibilities.
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7.1 Role Reputation
The structure organization and of institutions in Carrel mean that it could be
very useful to devise a system based on of role reputation over the basic security
presented here. For example, in our application we have diﬀerent proﬁles / type
of users such as coordinator, surgeons, guests and each one of them use / could
use diﬀerent functions.
7.2 Key Certiﬁcate Management
Due the importance of the keys in X–Security it would be useful to improve
the certiﬁcation management, including, for example automatic mechanisms for
detection of expiration (or when this data is early to arrive). And to include
new elements to sure that the owner of the key is available.
7.3 Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS)
Intrusion detection [13] is deﬁned as “the problem of identifying individuals who
are using a system without authorization and those who have legitime access to
the system but are abusing their privileges”.
In this area diﬀerent groups: Software Technology Center11, Autonomous
Agents for Intrusion Detection12 have applied (as is commented in [11]) agent–
based approach and Intrusion Detection to detect anomalous or malicious be-
haviours by agents that performs a certain security monitoring function at a
host.
Following the terminology used in [3] in the Figure 7 we have describe how
Intrusion Detection could be treated in Carrel.
In the diagram 7 transceivers are entities that oversee the operation of all the
agents running in their host on the other hand Monitors oversees the operation
of several transceivers.
Protection, detection and response are mechanisms to ensure our system.
The detection mechanism have been developed in initial state over Carrel we
should to include new elements such as intelligent alert, audit information and
so on to improve this mechanism.
11http://www.ipa.go.jp/STC/IDA/index.html
12http://www.cerias.purdue.edu/about/projects/aafid/
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8 Annex A: A cryptographic example for an
ACL message
In this short example we point out the diﬀerence between a simple text plain
message and encrypted message. Should observe that only the content of the
message is encrypted.
Text plain message:
(INFORM
:sender ( agent-identifier :name RRAgent@visit18:1090/JADE
:addresses (sequence http://visit18.lsi.upc.es:7778/acc ))
:receiver (set ( agent-identifier
:name IMAgent@visit18:1090/JADE
:addresses (sequence http://visit18.lsi.upc.es:7778/acc )) )
:content "((In_Room (agent-identifier
:name Finder@visit18:1090/JADE
:addresses (sequence http://visit18.lsi.upc.es:7778/acc )
:resolvers (sequence ) ) 1 ) )"
:language FIPA-SL0
:ontology Institution-Management-Ontology
)
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)Encrypted message:
(INFORM
:sender ( agent-identifier :name RRAgent@visit18:1090/JADE
:addresses (sequence http://visit18.lsi.upc.es:7778/acc ))
:receiver (set ( agent-identifier
:name IMAgent@visit18:1090/JADE
:addresses
(sequence http://visit18.lsi.upc.es:7778/acc )) )
:content "681F8EAF4D13C34447F07E341EE7A88006E98C9E1903C0E
E573805F26F117F3A7C555863164F43A10916BB9D47371FD33385F409FC
BCE04B6CDD93338786DD35A17DE1AAFF5DEB523664DCF3B3EA4BC988DB8
293849A6D73A31A16C0C5369319AFFE8BF40BE25F02C0A9AC95FCFF0E52
96E601A6CB7C5066C744B43A2E471EECCED32BFF414F5731614852EE2F6
3DE63098D44CFE58B18AE7AEFB216750E74CABE66F66F1CD491D0898C2F
6CA2BC9B625538F3CC648AD8483AB896E77032138B590515E43BFC987E0
E9A0C12D867BD82C3175E3C2A2BFD82E7A63181E63DE3C653F92682E250
03A01589F2379BC3CB1ABC108B4971E393D96F4FE4703D23424F"
:language FIPA-SL0
:ontology Institution-Management-Ontology
:X-Security "( :type CRYPT
:cert-ident SCA_CERTIFICATE_1 :key-ident CRYPT_1 )"
)
Also X–Security also adds a new slot it can be seen clearly named “X–
Security” that speciﬁes the type of encryption treatment which has been carried
out on the message as well as the identiﬁcation certiﬁcate and key.
9 Annex B: Including X–Security over MAS
In this section we point out the necessary modiﬁcations to make in order to use
X–Security package in our application. Mainly, we should modify our applica-
tion in three points described in the next subsections.
9.1 First point: Starting the agent
// create security for this agent
security = new Security(this);
// adding behaviour for this agent
addBehaviour(finder_behaviour);
SecConstants.setSCATimeout(1000000);
// waiting 20 second after starting agent
//(waiting for correct start of SCA)
System.out.println(""+this.getAID().getName()+"go to sleep...");
try {
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Thread.sleep(20000); } catch(Exception e) { /* exception */ }
System.out.println(""+this.getAID().getName()+") ... wake up.");
// starting this agent
System.out.println("Starting NormalAgent ...");
// starting ’Security’ of this agent
try {
registered = security.startAnyAgent(sec_path, this.getAID(),
sca_name, agent_user_name, agent_password);
if(registered==false) {
System.out.println("Registration with SCA - FAILURE");
this.doDelete();
}
} catch (SecException e) { /* exception */ }
// this agent is started
System.out.println("NormalAgent started.");
9.2 Second point: Sending messages
try {// encrypt content
security.enCrypt(reply);
} catch (SecException e1) {
System.out.println(" Send crypted message - ERROR ");
return;}
agent.send(reply);// send ’ACLMessage’
9.3 Third point: Receiving messages.
System.out.println("AnyAgentBehav:"+myAgent.getAID().getName());
System.out.println("--- Message received --- ");
// test for using security in this message
try {
((FinderAgent)myAgent).getSecurity().anyProcess(msg,this);
}
catch(SecException se) { // exception in security proces
System.out.println(se.toString());
switch(se.error) {
// certificate not found, message mut be put back
//to incoming queue and securty must wait for certificate
case SecConstants.PROCESS_STOP: {
System.out.println("AnyAgentBehav");
System.out.println(myAgent.getAID().getName());
System.out.println("--- Message putted back --- ");
block();
return;
}
// error in signature in message
case SecConstants.SIGNATURE_ERROR: { break; }
// error in encrypted message
case SecConstants.DECRYPT_ERROR: { break; }
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// signature doesn’t match sender
case SecConstants.SIGNATURE_NOT_MATCH_SENDER:
{ System.out.println(" ### SIGNATURE is not from this SENDER ###");
/*block(); return;*/ break;}
}
}
// security in message is correct
10 Annex C: Modiﬁcation of the Jade core
We have focused over FipaRequestResponderBehaviour, but the changes are
similar in other protocols which work as dispatchers requiring access to the
content slot.
1. To include the security classes.
import ctu.mas.security.*;
import ctu.mas.security.onto.*;
2. In the action function, ﬁrst of all, we should decrypt the message if it is
necessary.
final public void action() {
msg = myAgent.receive(template);
if(msg!=null){
ACLMessage message = (ACLMessage)msg.clone();
String secslot = msg.getUserDefinedParameter("Security");
if(secslot!=null){
try{
Security result=null;
try {
Method concatMethod;
concatMethod=(myAgent.getClass()).getMethod("getSecurity",null);
result = (Security) concatMethod.invoke(null, null);
} catch (Exception e) {
System.out.println(e);
}
result.anyProcess(message,this);
}catch(SecException se)
{ // exception in security proces}
3. Our agents should implement a static method that returns the security
variable.
public static Security getSecurity() {
return security;
}
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11 Annex D: Development details for Carrel
This annex describes concrete aspects related with to developed of Carrel fo-
cusing in two important aspects:
1. Upgrade to Jade
2. Functionalities oﬀered by Carrel
11.1 Upgrade to Jade
For compliance with FIPA 2000 speciﬁcations it was necessary the team Jade
to make some modiﬁcations to its API. This fact also forced the move from
the Jade 1.X to 2.X version. Also the new components / 3rd party elements
work with 2.X. version such as plug–in the MTP (Message Transport Protocol)
implementation of HTTP [8] and so on.
During the realization of our design we thought about the necessity to up-
grade the version of Jade over that works Carrel. Initially, Carrel was developed
for the Jade platform 1.X but the fact that the new components does not work
with this version they made us reconsidered which were the possibility about
realize an upgrade of platform in Carrel application. First at all, we depicted
the diﬀerent options in the next list and drawn in Figure 8:
1. Maintain Carrel using Jade platform 1.X version: In this case, the idea is
to deploy in diﬀerent platforms, Carrel on one platform 1.X and the rest
of elements on platform 2.X running Jade. With this solution we avoid
need to update Carrel application but not the fact of modify it. This idea
tries to disjoin our application and security systems running on diﬀerent
platforms but is necessary to communicate them. For this reason, it would
be necessary to design the diﬀerent protocols to oﬀer the Carrels’ services.
2. Update Carrel on Jade platform 2.X version: This option is more challeng-
ing but also the most durable. And our hope is that with this work the
next Carrel generation would be in a better position for future evolution.
We believe also that this step, was a forced step, because the update of
the versions is inherent in applications such Carrel that are in developed
phase.
The second option must chose the most important reason being the increased
utility for future development is more durable into the future. Once decided,
we describe the most important changes related to this work to update our ap-
plication here (we also used [4] to guide the changes necessaries):
In version 1.X it was possible to call the function ReceiverBehaviour with
msg parameter.
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Figure 8: Elections about Carrel upgrading
public void action() {
ReceiverBehaviour b = null;
if (bReceiveNewMessage) {
b = new ReceiverBehaviour(myAgent, msg, mt);
myAgent.addBehaviour(b);
bReceiveNewMessage = false;
In version 2.X, ReceiverBehaviour object that ends as soon as an ACL mes-
sage matching a given MessageTemplate arrives or timeout expires if you do the
same that in version 1.X you should to say in ReceiverBehaviour function that
an inﬁnite timeout it is be expressed by a value less than 0.
public void action() {
try {
if (bReceiveNewMessage) {
b = new ReceiverBehaviour(myAgent, -1, mt);
myAgent.addBehaviour(b);
bReceiveNewMessage = false;
} else {
msg = b.getMessage();
In version 1.X we have the notion of ComplexBehaviour.
ComplexBehaviour finder_behaviour = new SequentialBehaviour(this);
In version 2.X we do not have ComplexBehaviours for this reason is necessary
to change to:
SequentialBehaviour finder_behaviour = new SequentialBehaviour(this);
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In version 1.X we can use addSubBehaviour.
parent.addSubBehaviour(new CA_RequestInitiatorBehaviour(myAgent, request, mt));
But in version 2.X we should change the last sentence for:
SequentialBehaviour s = new SequentialBehaviour();
s.addSubBehaviour(new CA_RequestInitiatorBehaviour(myAgent, request, mt));
myAgent.addBehaviour(s);
Despite of the diﬀerent changes we should used -deprecation option when we
compile our ﬁles because we have some deprecated methods. Nevertheless the
application works well.
11.2 Functionalities oﬀered by Carrel
The most important for us is to have a stable version of Carrel even if not all
in the functionalities oﬀered in his ﬁrst version are present. At a ﬁrst glance,
we could see the stable version such a subgroup the all functionalities that work
adequately and it serves to us such foundations.
Although the transformation of Carrel between Jade version has been suc-
cessful a number of changes still remain to be done. The most important of
these is restablishing Carrel’s use of the databases storing patient data, piece
data and so forth. The connection was not made because other work is currently
being carried out by Damien Bousissou to change the database schemas used in
the Oracle 8i database.
Therefore the upgraded version of Carrel only functions with dummy data
rather than a connection to a complete database. The connection should be
relatively easy to establish once the database schema work is complete (a matter
of replacing a number of function calls).
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